Chronocide - Prologue to the Resurrection of Time.

 

Mikhail N. Epstein

 

 

                                                It is best not to look into the distance, or into the past;

                                                Only in the present is happiness and consolation                                                                                                    Johann Wolfgang Goethe

 

                                                Our intelligentsia could not live in the present;

                                                it lived in the future, and sometimes in the past.                                                                                                      Nikolai Berdyaev

 

 

1. Chronocide - genocide - ecocide

 

To liberate the future from the past ... To liberate the past from the future... For these two apparently contradictory concepts there is one word: revolution. It might be right-wing or left-wing, made in the name of the Great Utopia or the Great Tradition, but it cannot but be bloody. The first victim of revolution is time. Modern history has transformed the suffix “cide” - “murder” - into one of the most productive of neologisms. Regicide, patricide, parricide, genocide, ecocide... This suffix made an especially brilliant career after 1944, when the word genocide was introduced into everyday life by the American lawyer of Polish extraction, Raphael Lemkin. At the close of the century, generalising from its rich criminal experience, I would like to suggest one more neologism: “Chronocide” - the murder of time...   

 

Chronocide, genocide and ecocide are linked, as a rule, in a straight line of revolutionary succession. Revolution starts with Chronocide, with the ideological murder of the past in the name of an abstract future. Then the revolution starts to devour the life of real people. This is genocide - the murder of whole nations, estates or classes condemned to remain in the past, or deemed unworthy of the future. In the end the exhausted revolution, despairing of giving what it promised, and having destroyed society’s industrial forces, comes to a conclusion in the rapacious consumption and destruction of defenceless nature - in ecocide. After polishing off time, the revolution lunges on the people, and finally exhausts the living resources of nature. Usually the consequences of genocide and ecocide admit of a more objective estimation - demographical losses, the exhaustion of natural resources. But the beginning of revolution is Chronocide. It is an invisible cataclysm in the people’s consciousness, in which it tears itself from the habitat of time, frees itself from the past.

 

... or from the future. If at the dawn of the century the revolution was considered as a victory over the bloody past, a leap into the coming kingdom of freedom, then at the twilight of the century the rays of the setting sun nostalgically illuminate the depths of history. And look! - the ideas of the right, of counter-revolution, have begun to gain sway over minds. The Great Tradition, forgotten over the course of the millennium, must now be freed from the rotten deposits of chimerical progress. Let us heed the voice of the new revolution, proclaiming the freedom of the past from the future: “Our basic task ... is the restoration of the Integral Tradition in all its dimensions. Tradition, according to René Genona, is the sum of divinely revealed, super-temporal knowledge. It constituted the order of all sacred civilisations - from the heavenly empires of the golden age, which disappeared many millennia ago, to the civilisation of the middle ages...”1 This means that everything that happened after the middle ages - Michelangelo and Leonardo, Shakespeare and Goethe, Mozart and Kant - is a retreat, a betrayal, or a mistake. All the novelties of the modern era - yes, the very idea of novelty itself - must be burnt in the penitential fire of the last revolution. “The fire of the global national revolution, the socialistic revolution, the last revolution, which will terminate human history’s cycle of decline, is on the march.”2

 

Again an assault on time, this time the murder of a cursed future in the name of a holy past! As always, Chronocide summons the spectre of revolution - this time not a left-progressive but a Fascist or National-Socialist revolution. The crime of revolutions is not only that they negate time, that they negate the life of entire nations, but also that they create their own “monstrous negations.”3 The right-wing revolution, which is giving the boot to the twentieth century - and indeed to the whole of the modern era - is the monstrous negation of that left-wing revolution which repudiated the inheritance of the “exploitatory” society and burst open the door to the classless future.

 

2. The Future in the past. Anomalies of time in Russia.

 

Quite possibly, this “reversal of time” happened nowhere with such insane consequences as in Russia. Here the victim of the reciprocal “liberation” of the future from the past was the present. It bore the bloody scar of the shattered chain of time. The present here has almost never had its own independent value. It has been perceived either as an echo of the past or a stepping stone to the future. Didorot, who corresponded with Catherine II, and who despaired of bring the fruits of Enlightenment to Russia, pointed out that this country was “a fruit which has gone rotten before ripening.”4 In other words, the future of this country turned out to be in its past, not having had time to ripen for the present. Similar thoughts were subsequently expressed by Russian thinkers. “Russia is fated to useless escapades, hastily embarked on and hastily abandoned.” (Prince M. Sherbatov) “We are growing, but not ripening...” (P. Chaadaev) “We were born well, but have grown very little.” (V. V. Rozanov)5 If the past corresponds to youth, the present to maturity, and the future to old age, then Russia is at the same time youthful and senile, quietly skipping the stage of maturity.

 

This distinguishes Russia both from the great Eastern civilisations - in which the present is fastened to the past by an unbreakable ethnic tradition - and from the modern civilisations of the West - in which the present is fastened to the future through uninterrupted technical progress. In Russia the past is fastened directly to the future, as if  hanging under a missing, imperceptible present. Russian civilisation is at the same time archaic and futuristic; this is its tragic rupture. But this is also its special value for culturological study. In Russia the mechanisms of renewal are naked; the future and past are joined directly, without the gentle intervention of the present.

 

In their semiotic works, Yuri Lotman and Boris Uspensky have already thoroughly analysed the dualistic nature of Russian culture. Russian culture usually avoids the third, neutral member in any intellectual opposition. Thus the gods of pagan antiquity were either considered an impure force or else merged with images of the Christian saints, but they were never evaluated neutrally. The attitude of Russia to the West passed through many stages. Either a “new” Russia was gaining ascendancy over an “ancient” West, or a “new” West was humiliating an “ancient” Russia, but the two were hardly ever considered as existing on one neutral plane. Likewise, Russian religious consciousness has always recognised hell and heaven, but never purgatory. This general principle explains why the present, in Russian culture, has been gently erased: it is the middling, neutral member in the historical opposition “past - future.” In keeping with the dualistic model of Lotman and Uspensky, Russian culture moves not through smooth, negotiated oppositions, but through dramatic reversals.6

 

This is confirmed by the most recent examples. That which yesterday was considered the future - Communism, “the classless society” - has suddenly, unable to become the present, become the past. Overnight it became a burdensome legacy or relic, to be disposed of quickly. And visa versa, that which was considered the distant past - the free market, capitalism, the constituent assembly, even monarchy and class division - suddenly all these things were transferred to the desirable future.

 

It would seem that the most radical of all possible interpretations of the end of the 20th century was the one offered by American sociologist Francis Fukuyama: the collapse of Soviet Communism spells the world-wide triumph of Western democracy, the end of global conflict, and, therefore, the “end of world history.” But for Russia it was something even more radical than the end - namely, a reversal or a turning upside-down. The “end” is, after all, the end. It is a normal point in the temporal process, unavoidable after a certain stage of development. However, in the consciousness of Russia, the collapse of Communism signified not the end, but a re-arrangement of beginning and end, an incredible anomaly in the temporal process. That which throughout the Soviet period was perceived as the Communist future suddenly became the past, while the feudal and bourgeois past started to draw near from the other side, from the eagerly awaited future. The future and the past swapped places. The entire course of history, once so confidently sketched by Marxism, was turned upside-down. The shock affected not only Russia, but the whole of humanity. The whole world had somehow been dragged into the Communist project, if only in opposition to it. But for Russia, having lived through her own future, to suddenly find herself in the arrier-garde of world-history, on the fringe of capitalism, or even on the fringe of serfdom - such an explosive break with one’s own past hasn’t been experienced, perhaps, by any modern culture.

 

At any moment of history there must exist different epochs, as well as different nations. The “society of the future,” in which the stationary, conservative elements of the past were destroyed, was as sterile and dangerous for its inhabitants as the “society of the past,” in which the elements of novelty, threatening to tradition, were destroyed. Those middling, transitional elements, in which the future and the past find their living connection, are called the present. In the Russian language the word “present” has a double meaning: not just “now,” a state belonging to certain moments of time, but “genuine,” “truthful,” “real”... This is why the murderers of time, those who attempted to liberate the future from the past and the past from the future, who attempted to destroy the present, can be condemned with the pronouncement of Goethe:

 

Do not to look into the distance, or into the past;

Only in the present is happiness and delight.

 

And it is fitting that a condemnation of “Chronocide” should be proclaimed in Weimar, the town of Goethe, just as the universal condemnation of genocide was proclaimed in another German town - Nuremberg.

 

3. The Utopia of the Present. Time as Postponement.

 

However, Goethe’s thought, taken in the context of Faust as a whole, acquires an ironic meaning. To live only in the present is just one more - the most refined - form  of Chronocide. To halt the moment, however wonderful it is, is to transform it into a corpse of eternity, just as Faust himself, who desired such a cessation of time, falls down dead.

 

... I take my joy, my highest moment this.

(Faust sinks back into the arms of the Lemurs, who lay him upon the ground.)

 

It is well known that Faust’s dream was realised only with the aid of Mephistopheles - the spirit of negation. The frozen moment, the full and final “beauty of life,” is death for the decrepit Faust. In his last moments he seems to hear the sound of free labour on the free earth; in fact he is merely hearing the noise of the spades with which, to the accompaniment of Mephistopheles’ laughter, demons are digging his grave.

 

This Goethian irony seems particularly appropriate to the age which marches under the banner of “postmodernism.” Postmodernism is the most sophisticated form of burying time, under the pretext of saving and immortalising it in countless repetitions and postponements. If the theoreticians of tradition are bewitched by the distant past, by some mythical golden age, the absolute beginning of everything, then the theoreticians of postmodernism, disclaiming any kind of beginning, celebrate the end and completion of everything in the here and now, in the eternal present. Postmodernism is the frozen moment, a gigantically inflated soap bubble of time, on the fine film of which all ages -  past and future - are reflected. The prototype of postmodernism is the exhausted Faust at the end of his global travels, when, in the words of Mephistopheles,

 

Him would no joys content, no fortune please,

And thus he wooed his changing fantasies.

This wretched, empty moment at the last

He sought, poor wretch, to grasp and hold it fast.

 

Ihn sattigt keine Lust, ihm ghugt kein Gluck,

So buhlt er fort nach wechselnden Gestalten;

Den letzten, schlechten, leeren Augenblick,

Der Arme wunscht ihn festzuhalten.

 

This can be taken as a parable about the fate of Western humanity. Initially, like Faust, it could not quench its thirst for all that is endless and exceeds the limits of time. But it finally surrendered to the charm of the passing moment, the lack of substance, the play of “mercurial shadows.” All ideals previously pursued by humanity are now reduced to a “shadow theatre” - stylish devices of “meta-narration,” signs in a game of signs. Postmodern theory, of course, realises perfectly well the secret irony of such a mentality, so similar to the tragic conclusion of the Faustian project: “Then to the passing moment might I say/ Thou art so beautiful, wilt thou not stay.” The frozen moment, the arrested present - all this is only a parody of eternity. If Faust is the hero of the modern age, then isn’t his companion Mephistopheles the genius of postmodernism?

 

Mephistopheles:

 

What matters our creative endless toil,

When, at a snatch, oblivion ends the coil?

“It is by-gone” - How shall this riddle run?

As good as if things never had begun,

Yet circle back, existence to possess:

I’d rather have Eternal Emptiness.

 

Postmodernism, at least in theory, not only terminates all former strivings (“everything is finished”), but persistently asks: Was there a beginning at all? It abolishes the very category of origin and originality. Any text becomes “ambiguous and obscure” in the process of its deconstruction; the only things not cast into doubt are the concepts of emptiness (“Ewig-Leere”), the metaphysics of absence, suspension and eternal postponement.

 

Time itself in deconstruction is interpreted as endless postponement. It is thus freed from the past and the future, hung in a timeless emptiness, in a limitlessly extended present. According to the founder of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida, the activity of “différance” creates both a spatial and temporal interval. But as a result any radical difference between time and space is eliminated. In the words of Derrida, “In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). It is this ... that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-trace, or différance. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization.”7 “Différer” in French means both “to differentiate” and “to postpone, to defer, to slow down.” Taken as a definition of time, this transforms it into a pure interval. Time is stretched or unfolded. It resembles space, insofar as there is no qualitative difference between its moments, but only distance or delay, during which nothing happens. “Différer in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfilment of ‘desire’ or ‘will’ ...”8

 

Time is formed by throwing its presence from one moment to the next. Between them is nothing but a mechanical stretch, a tick of the clock and a turn of the hand. Postponement means emptiness, qualitiless time, in which the next moment is only the postponement of the previous. Such time is familiar to us from Beckett’s play, Waiting for Godot, in which the coming of Godot is postponed for an indefinite period of time. Postponement is a “difference” that functions as an “identity.” Insofar as the same “something” is carried from one moment of time to the next, time becomes self-identical and is eliminated as time. In its place remains a pure interval that could be called time or space - they are indistinguishable. Différance is transformed into indifférance. Isn’t it paradoxical that the very same postponement which, according to Derrida, establishes time, allows time to flow, also abolishes time, transforming different moments into identical moments, the last one being merely the postponement of the first. In his manifesto of postmodern theology Mark Taylor, a follower of Derrida, depicts the kingdom of the “eternal interval”: “The universality of the medium implies that what is intermediate is not transitory and that what is interstitial is ‘permanent.’ Though always betwixt ‘n’ between, the ‘eternal’ time of the middle neither begins nor ends.”9

 

 

This is why the  postmodern paradigm, developed chiefly in the philosophy of Derrida, excludes time. If time is understood as postponement, it turns out to be the postponement of time itself. In the language of différance, “later” sounds like “never.” The girl says to her father: “Let’s go for a walk!” He, comfortably seated on the sofa with a book, replies: “Later!” The citizen says to the State: “When are we going to end violence and guarantee everyone the right to life?” The State, swelling its bureaucratic muscles, replies, “Later!” This “later,” penetrating the very flesh and blood of our time, has become postmodernism. The very concept of postmodernism itself, this vivacious sepulchre,  this “all” after all, derives from the philosophy of defered expectations. Neither history - the continuity of time - nor eschatology - the end of time - fill this interval; they merely retain for themselves the significance of pure postponement. All that remains for the people of postmodernity is to wait for the coming of time with the same fear and hope with which they once waited for the coming of eternity. “Postmodernism,” however, is neither time nor eternity, but the metaphysics of pure repetition. The very same moment of time that  is being postponed till later is reproduced in the form of “eternal recurrence.” The girl repeats her question to her father, the citizen to the state, the human being to God (“Godot”), but in the interlude nothing happens.

 

A similar motif creeps in to the work of Derrida himself, when différance, in connection with the philosophy of Nietzsche, is expounded as the myth of eternal recurrence. “And on the basis of this unfolding of the same as différance, we see the sameness of différance and repetition in the eternal return.”10 “Eternal recurrence” is the most metaphysical of all Nietzsche’s ideas, the price he paid for the attempt to destroy all previous metaphysics. Endlessness - which, with the “death of God,” was deprived of the movement of transcendence, the breakthrough into another realm - took on the characteristics of self-identity.  It eternally goes from itself and returns to itself - because it has nowhere to go, because the path, open to the prophets of the other kingdom, for it is closed. Différance, insofar as it works against any metaphysic, against radical otherness, against transcendence, also ends up as a form of self-identity. The “difference” in it only creates intervals between the elements of repetition. If postponement is not temporal, if there is nothing behind the frontier of postponement, it means that the moment postponed will be repeated again and again. It can never complete itself and give way to the next moment, just as a gramophone needle, removed from the groove and caught in a trap of “postponement,” repeats the same musical phrase.

 

Postmodernism, as is obvious from the very term, tries to stop the flow of historical time and to build some kind of post-historical space. It acts as a “time-keeper,” in which all the discursive practices, styles and strategies of the past will find their echo, their imitative gesture, will be encompassed in the endless play of signifying transcodes.) “If history has become spacial, then even her repression has become spacial, and all those ideological mechanisms by means of which we avoid thinking historically ...”11 Thus Frederic Jameson describes the condition of the newest post-historicism, which transforms time into the condition of space.         

     

4. The Resurrection of the Future.

 

Thus there are three fundamental forms of Chronocide: the utopian obsession with the future (“the happiness of coming generations”), the nostalgic obsession with the past (“The Great Tradition”) and the postmodern amusement with the present (“the disappearance of time in a synchronic play of significations”). The three fundamental modes of time - future, past and present - are transformed into three techniques of Chronocide the moment one of them is absolutised at the expense of the others.

 

How can we initiate the resurrection of time? That which dies first must, obviously, be resurrected first. All catastrophic “timequakes” in the history of the world have begun with the alienation of the future. It was removed from the course of time and placed on a pedestal like a bloodthirsty idol. The ensuing envious and vengeful reactions against “futurocracy” led to the birth of a new idolatry of time. Now, on the eve of the grandiose celebrations of the new millennium, our priority must be to establish confidence in the future. We must rectify it, like a dislocated joint in the living chain of time. Are we really going to celebrate the beginning of the new century with a curse on the future; will our festivities be double-spirited - a celebratory cup filled with the same poison that has cankered the hopes of this passing century?

 

Obsession with “the future” has been the great seduction and curse of the twentieth century, the legacy of nineteenth century optimism and progressivism. But this is no reason to poison the twenty-first century with the scepticism of the twentieth century. “From whence danger; from thence salvation.” For many decades Communism appeared to be the inevitable future of all humanity; countless victims were sacrificed on its alter. It is still considered indecent, maybe even shameful, to talk about the future. It is supposedly tainted by complicity with “the occupants of the future,” with utopians and totalitarians, who in the name of the future inflicted violence on the present. However, now is the time to recognise that the future is innocent. It deceived all those who tried to possess it. It was not that bloodthirsty divinity for which it was taken by the priests of the revolution. On the contrary, the future is the overthrower of all divinities and idols, even those erected in its honour. The fact that the “Communist future” has remained in the past means that the future has been purged of one more spectre. This kind of purification - or demythologisation - of time is the special function of the future. Now the future is advancing on humanity again, this time not with an exclamation mark but with a question mark.

 

The epoch in which we live, the epoch “after the death of the future,” does not just abolish the future; it restores its purity anew. Now, after all utopias and anti-utopias, we need - maybe for the first time in history - to plumb the whole depth and deceptiveness of this purity. This is not the purity of the tabula rasa, on which we can write anything we want, fulfil any grandiose project. Rather, the future will have the purity of a rubber, erasing from the tabula rasa the clear lines of any design, reducing all projects to a blur - the dim remnant of an evaporated utopia. A new vision is being revealled to us - a vision of the future as a great ironist. It will never will allow itself to become objectivised, to become ameanable to strict analysis and prognosis.

 

This refers us to Bakhtin, who wrote about the impossibility of finalising history from inside history itself - and about the future as the comic exposure of such attempts to cease what is ceaseless. “... Nothing definitive in the world has yet taken place; the last word of the world, about the world, has not yet been spoken; the world is open and free; everything is still to come and will always be still to come. This, you see, is the purifying meaning of ambivalent laughter.”12 This, one might add, is  the purifying, idol-destroying meaning of the future. The future is the laughter-filled openness of being, in which all finalised forms disappear. It is significant that “future” in the Russian language has the same root as “being,” whereas “past” and “present” are formed from entirely different concepts: “to pass” and “to stand.” The most mysterious thing about being is its futuriority, its ceaselessness and its tirelessness, its otherness and outsidedness in relation to all existing things.

 

Doesn’t my paean to the future sound like a new utopian heresy? The point is that in order for the postmodern critic of utopia to overcome utopianism, the standpoint of anti-utopianism or even post-utopianism is necessary but insufficient. We must reawaken love for the future, not as a promised land, but as a state of promise. This is not that love which was bequeathed to us by Chernyshevsky in his novel, What shall we do? “Love the future! Bring from it into the present as much as you can carry!” The future here is represented as a ready-prepared storehouse of joys, which are only waiting to be carried into the present. However, the only future that deserves love is one from which it is impossible to carry anything into the present, because it advances with the same speed that the present retreats into the past. Despite the fact that usually we say “the future is advancing,” it retreats every moment to a place we can never reach.                

 

It is partly language itself that is guilty of the fact that the future appears to be running over us, crushing us under its wheels. We say that the future is  “advancing” (nastupaet), as it might be said about infantry. In the English language this association is not active; there the future is “coming” or “approaching” like a train towards the station of the present, from whence it will move on into the past. In Russian, the future conducts itself aggressively.

 

It would be more accurate to say that the future has two mutually exclusive sides, two diverging frontiers: the future of the coming event and the coming of the future itself. It is well known that as one moves forwards that which is distant becomes close, but distance itself moves on ahead. What is the future: the approaching object or the retreating distance? The point is that the future is always double-faced, like an ironical utterance where “yes” means “no.” The future is at once approaching and fleeing. It is both an easily available whore and an eternally distant virgin. This is why we are attracted to the future. For the capacious human heart, it unites the ideals of Sodom and the Madonna. A shamelessly exposed loin, which everyone is free to invade: - and a shining innocent visage, melting into the mist. One future approaches swiftly and physically surrounds us, becoming present. It is summoned by utopians of all ages, impatiently demanding its arrival. The other future retreats from us with the same speed that the first future approaches us.

 

It was precisely such an ever-retreating future that the philosopher Semen Frank described in his book Unfathomability: “We know nothing definite about the future. The future is always the great x of our life - an unknown, impenetrable mystery.”13 Just as the future is allegedly algebraic rather than arithmetical, so we approach the future not as a precise quantity, but as an unknown. We know that winter always comes after autumn, and summer after spring. But do winter and summer belong the future? No, they are elements of a repeating cycle. They appear as future only in relation to the previous phases of the cycle, and thus as past in relation to its following phases. The future as such cannot not be construed a cycle, as a rhythm of repetitions.

 

Any event appears at first as future, then as present, and finally as past: it is played in all three registers of time. This is why the event is always multi-coloured and three-dimensional; we perceive it from the front, the side, and from the back. But it does not follow from this that we can muddle up the colours themselves. Communism, traditionalism and postmodernism suffer from colour-blindness in relation to time. It seems to them that the future can become present, or that the past can become the future, or that the present is the eternally postponed future. In reality, the event approaches us from the future and rushes into the past, but the future itself never approaches. It it is impossible to take it, to possess it, or to exhaust it. The future is like a cannon; it fires the event towards us, but it itself rolls back.

 

The period we are entering is no longer a period after something: post-communism, postmodernism, post-industrialism, post-structuralism. It is rather the era of “proto-”  of the birth of some new cultural formation. When we make a sketch we use rubber almost as much as we do pencil. This is why there is now such a great demand for an unknown future, a future that blurs the exactness of our projects rather than accomplishing them. “Proto” does not presage or determine the future, but softens the present and imparts to any script the character of a draft, raw and unfinished. “Proto” is a new, non-coercive attitude to the future, in which the mode of “perhaps” replaces the former “must be” or “yes, will be.” “Proto” is an age of changable projects, which do not submit themselves to our single reality, but multiply alternative possibilities. The future is not written under the dictation of utopia. On the contrary, it erases its cruel features and transforms it into a “proto-utopia,” a sketch of one of many futures. The future is a soft form of negation, the bluring of all signs, the dispersion of all meanings.

 

As opposed to the avant-garde or utopian project, consciously rushing into the future so as to reconstruct it, “proto-” emphasises the unaccountability and the unpredictability of the future. The future acts in the same way as the unconscious of Freud or the language of Lacan. The future is as unpredictable as it is unchangeable; it is the general sphere of otherness; it is itself “other” from all that we have been given in experience, all that we have come into contact with. Language none the less exists, the unconscious none the less exists, and we have been given certain methods of deciphering them, an (albeit somewhat imperfect) grammar. But the future is a language without grammar, an unconscious without dreams, pure nothingness. It inescapably becomes everything so as again and again to remain nothing.  

 

5. Not revolution, but potentiation

 

To restore trust in the future means to find a new model of development that is in harmony with the passage of time. That fatal substitute, which laid the foundations of revolutionary-utopian thinking and afterwards initiated the chain reaction of traditionalism and postmodernism, was first and formost a metaphysical substitute. According to that conception, the present appears as a realm of ideas and ideals; the future as the realm of their realisation. The present is the kingdom of possibilities; the future is the process of their realisation.

 

European metaphysics created the kingdom of general ideas. But it had its other side in European history, the aspiration of which was to bring these abstract ideas back down to earth, to incarnate them in political, moral and legal institutions. Nothing attracted to the European citizen as much as abstraction.14 In this sense history and metaphysics can be considered as two moments in the same continually recurring movement of ideas. The idea was abstracted from real life (the metaphysical act) so as to become involved with a new force in the transformation of that reality (the historical act). The ideas of freedom, of equality, of national and racial greatness, of religious exclusivity, actively influenced the course of history. The very abstraction of these ideas made them attractive, demanded their involvement in history.

 

Even the most radical oppositional movements, movements that threatened to blow up European civilisation, changed its mentality very little. On the contrary, they intensified it and took it to extremes. We all know the role played  by the cult of abstract ideas - under the names of “ideology” and “propaganda” - in Communist Russia and Nazi Germany. The more these ideas were separated from life, the more persistently they demanded embodiment. The slogans proclaimed in May 1968 from the student barricades in Paris - “All power to the imagination!” “Heaven immediately!” - were an act of profound self-expression on the part of European civilisation. The imagination was called to power, to action. Everything dreamed in sleep and in waking must be realised. “Make human everything impersonal, Fulfil all unaccomplished dreams!”15

 

This is how possibility was linked to reality in European consciousness; possibilities were taken from reality in order to link them to it again. “Realise your possibilities; fulfil them here and now!” - this imperative was given power in social and individual consciousness. Even religious consciousness hoped for the resurrection of the dead and the millennial kingdom here, on this earth, so as to “make human everything impersonal” and to “fulfil all unaccomplished dreams.”

 

However, this model, which has faithfully served the development of Western civilisation over many centuries, refuses to work any longer. There is no enthusiasm for either metaphysical abstraction or for historical involvement. At the end of the twentieth century it has become popular to talk not only about the end of metaphysics but also about the end of history. In fact these two ends are one end - the intersection of two strait lines stubbonly advancing towards one another. In his well known work, The End of History? Frances Fukayama came to the conclusion that all monumental ideas (fascist, communist, religious fundamentalist) had become exhausted in the face of competition with the liberal-democratic idea. However, the essence of the matter is not that some ideas have been displaced by others, but in that ideology itself has been exhausted as an active historical force. We are seeing the end of the metaphysical production of history, in which ideas, initially abstracted from reality, were then realised in it.

 

J. F. Leotard, in his critique of J. Habermas, stresses that the great European project of Enlightenment was not realised at all.  This is not because it was abandoned; it  was destroyed precisely in the course of its own realisation - in Auschwitz and Kolyma. “Tending to realisation ... the Idea (of freedom, of ‘Enlightenment,’ of socialism and so forth) possesses a legitimising force to the extent that it is universal. ... My argument is that the modern project (the realisation of universality) was not abandonned or forgotten, but destroyed, ‘liquidated’.”16 The precise historical moment at which the project destroyed itself, at which the ironical dialectic of Enlightenment was fulfilled, marked the beginning of a new movement. Liberal-democratic society no longer promotes abstract ideas to be drawn into the service of society. Here another model operates: the incessent production of new possibilities that do not demand realisation, that are valuable and efficacious in themselves despite remaining as possibilities.

 

As long the future is contemplated in the indicative or imperative mood, as a “will be” or a “must be,” the present will inevitably be coerced by the future. The Russian language, which forms “future” from “will be,” is the basis of this tendency to conceive of the future in the indicative mood. But if thought refuses to follow language obediently, but rather struggles with its aberrations (doesn’t the task of thought consist in this resistance to language and its treacherous promptings?), then future can be imagined as an realm of opportunity, as an incompleteness that has value in itself. The future is not something that will be (as it was thought of by plan, manifesto and utopia), but something that may be.  A possibility never comes alone, but only in the form of doubling and multiplying possibilities. Possibilities clash and yet do not mutually exclude one another. A possibility that excludes all others  - this is already an inevitable, resolved fact; even more than a fact - a necessity. As long as we speak about the future in the singular it is binding and inevitable; it is inscribed in the indicative and imperative mood. The future in the subjunctive mood is an open fan of futures, of diverging possibilities.

 

I will remind you that until the twentieth century the word “culture” was used only in the singular case, in the sense of a norm or a model. The concept of cultural pluralism emerged slowly, but at the end of our century the plural has begun to prevail in the use of this term - in anthropology, history, ethnography and in “cultural research.” At the turn of the twenty-first century, won’t  a similar metamorphosis take place with the concept of  “future?” Won’t the binding singular - something that will necessarily “be” - be transformed into the plural - a multitude of “maybes?” Discredited by utopian ideologies and totalitarian regimes, the concept of the “future” can be justified for the future only as the coexistence and interaction of different futures.

 

The twentieth century has exhibited two main models of development. The first is the revolutionary one.  This was the culmination of many centuries of European history, even though it came to fruition in Eastern Europe and Asia. This model can be described as “the realisation of possibilities,” their narrowing to one desired and binding reality. Revolution is a natural consequence of the type of mentality developed in the West, according to which history is a succession of realised possibilities, grasped first in mind and imagination and then incarnated in life. In this model the real is sacrificed to the possible; some possibilities are cut down and sacrificed to others. Attempted by Soviet and International Communism, this revolutionary model, as is well known, had rather unfortunate results.

 

However, from approximately the middle of the twentieth century, in the countries of the West, a new model has begun to operate, allowing those countries to avoid the horrors of revolutionary violence. This new model developed largely as a reaction against Fascism and Communism, which dragged humanity into a world war for the partition of the “predestined future.” The basis of this new historical model is a development not from the possible to the real, but from the real to the possible. This erects a barrier against the time when from a number of possibilities only one was chosen, binding on the whole of humanity - and the past and the present were sacrificed to it.

 

The process of opening the present to the multiplicity of futures can be called “potentiation.” Potentiation is a raising of the degree of pontentiality in reality itself, a process of transforming facts into probabilities, theories into hypothoses, assertions into suggestions, necessities into possibilities. All modern reality is made of such “potentialities.” It is becoming more and more conditional. It is being transformed from “is” into “if,” from “to be” into “might be.”

 

In the next three chapters some aspects of the new model - and how they are realised in the social, cultural and ethical fields - will be sketched.

 

6. Society.

 

Let us recall the well-known expression which is often applied to the countries of the “first world:” “the land of opportunity.” These are not abstract opportunities, but the economic foundation of modern society. Here we can point to the extensive system of credit and insurance that translates everyday life into the subjunctive mood. I live on resources which I could earn: this is credit. I pay for services which I might need: this is insurance. The modern West is the civilisation of possibilities in the sense that here they penetrate the very texture of everyday existence. I do not possess what I possess, but what I might possess if ... (in these brackets might be put any condition of life: employment or retirement, marriage or divorce, etc.) Credit and insurance companies busy themselves with the precise estimation of all my life-chances, beginning with my health, age and education. They deal not only with me as I am, but with all my possible future states. Insurance and credit are two correlated forms of potentiality. In insurance I pay in advance for any potential accident: sickness, car crashes, unemployment, death or disability. In credit I am paid potential forms of well-being: a house, a car, a television etc. Both positive and negative sides of life appear entirely conditional from the viewpoint of economics, because economics is based on statistics and the estimation of probabilities, not on the singular and unrepeatable fact.

 

For people accustomed to a non-western style of life, with its hard realities and its more binding norms, it is very difficult to switch into this game of possibilities, where every “if” has its own “that” and every “that” its own “if.” Nothing exists just so, in the indicative mood, but everything skates on the edge of “as if.” One possibility opens onto another, and the whole of reality consists of alternating possibilities which are hardly ever realised in themselves.

 

The same happens in social and political life. Insofar as traditionalist, authoritarian and totalitarian societies subordinate the life of their citizens to a strict regimantation, then Western democracy is right to call itself “the free society.” Its citizens are free in their choice of rulers, occupations, places of travel and so forth. But the “free society” and the “society of opportunity” characterise two different aspects of Western democracy. Social and political freedom is opposed to despotism and coecion; it inhabits the same plane of meaning as “the suppression of freedom” and “political repression.” This is why the definition of Western society as free has started to look outdated, especially after the collapse of Communist regimes in Europe. Additionally, at the structural level, Western society is not free at all; it is much more harshly constrained by internal economic and technological relations than totalitarian societies. This explains the fact of its amazing historical stability. But another definition of Western society - not “freedom” but “potentiality” - has a more important meaning.

 

Potentiality, in distinction from freedom,  is not a call for the real forces of rule; it is the transition to another, conditional-hypothetical, mode of existence. The voter is free when he has the right to nominate and vote for his canditate, - this is the tradition, let us say, of American democracy. But where should we locate the role of the so called “primaries” and polls? These are regularly carried out around the country in anticipation of elections. They represent a hypothetical model of the election that nevertheless seriously influences the final result. American observers point out that the introduction of polls significantly influenced the election system in the USA, transforming it into a kind of multilevel spectacle, where each conditional assumption depends on the previous ones, where one stage-set is pushed inside another. It is no accident that in America the popular expression of Bismark, “politics is the science of the possible” - here transformed into “politics is the art of the possible” (R.A. Butler) - has taken on an additional meaning. Politics is not only the art of balancing possibilities and realising possibilities, but also the art  of “possibilising” reality, giving it a conditional character.

 

I am by no means  inclined to consider this model of development as an “ideal,” but the point is that the very catagory of the ideal will for a long time be compromised by the old progressive-revolutionary model. We are not talking about an ideal, but about the ever greater unreality of the Western style of life, which increasingly empowers “as if” and “may be.” The “dictatorship of the possible” - potentiocracy - has its negative aspects. These include the power of credit, insurance, and advertising companies, trading with the “thin air” of possibilities. In advertisements, for example, things are separated from their direct “thingness” and represented as symbols of human possibilities. Some drink not only quenches thirst, it makes it possible to inhale the aroma of the jungle, to exchange a humid kiss with your lover, to see the sea through the prism of a frosted glass ... The advertisement doesn’t lie, doesn’t misrepresent the facts (that would be illegal and unprofitable), but it puts a seductive construction on the facts. We can complain of the primitive nature of such advertisement, but it is no more primitive than the object advertised; on the contrary, it multiplies its aspects, creates from it an illusion of other life. The advertisement is the lowest form of art, but it is the highest form of object-trading reality, a method of magically transporting it into the world of “as if.”

 

The “opportunity society” is also the information society. In it are produced and consumed not only objects - units of physical reality - but also texts - units of information. It has become more or less a truism that in the post-industrial era capital has given way to information as the basic social resource. But from this follows a far from trivial conclusion. The value of any communication is proportionate to the unexpectedness of what is communicated. It is a fluid quantity; it increases to the extent that the probability of the events communicated diminishes. Naturally, the information society is keen to increase the volume of information which it possesses, because this is its main source of wealth - the tendency is as unarguable as the law the growth of capital or the increase of profit. But what is the growth of information, if not an increase in the probabilistic character of social life? Information grows to the extent that the world grows less predictable, consists of increasingly improbable events. This is the root of the cult of novelty, the striving of every person to be, in at least something, original and “unpredictable.” This is the main condition of the development of the information society. In this sense, the expressions “the opportunity society” and “the information society” are synonyms; it is precisely the abundance of possibilities that is realised in one of these informational events.

 

In developed societies the accent of meaning is transferred from reality to possibility, because a life filled with possibilities is perceptibly richer and more valuable than a life lived on the plain of actual existence. In the final analysis, the reality of human life is limited by the parameters that belong to man as a generic creature, and are more or less similar in all civilisations (the maintenance of the organs of perception, of life expectancy and so forth). It is impossible to eat more than one is capable of eating; it is impossible to see more than one is capable of seeing; and these limits are close to being reached in the developed countries of the West, at least for a significant part of the population. But the richness of life depends more on the multiplication of its possibilities than on their fulfilment. Reality is constant in its significant denominators, but possibility is a continually increasing vector of civilisation. The development of civilisation by one unit of reality results in a still  greater increase of possibilities. In this lies the poetic side of progress, normally screened by its practical side.

 

7. Culture.

 

It is well known that the principle of a probabilistic universe found a home for itself in the strictest and most fantastic science of the twentieth century - physics. At the base of physical reality lies not “is” but “might be” - a special curve of possible motion and mass-energy for each particle, which altogether form an undulating graph of probability. Coming from natural science to the humanities, we observe not only the action of probabilistic laws, but the growth of the same probabilistic tendencies in culture. This can be observed in the fate of different genres.   

 

So, M. Bakhtin, distinguishing the novel from the epic, comes to the conclusion that if in the epic necessity prevails, then in the novel possibility prevails. “The epic world … is fixed, closed and unchanging - in its factuality, in its meaning and in its value.”17 Not only does the hero of the epic act in the sphere of necessity, but the author himself pictures the epic reality as the only true one, unarguable and absolute in its value and factuality. “A person depicted in a highly distanced genre is a person of the absolute past and the distant image. ... All his potential, all his possibilities, are fully realised in his external social position, in his fate ... He has already become all that he could be, and he could be nothing other than what he has already become.”18 The hero of the novel, on the other hand, presents himself as pure potential that can never be realised in any external state, let alone frozen in the “distant image” of legend and teaching. “He is not fully incarnated in existing socio-historical flesh ... The reality of the novel is one of many possible realities. It is contingent, accidental, and contains in itself other possibilities.“19 The hero of the novel is caught in various situations which try “embody” him, to thrust upon him one or another social or psychological role, but the novel’s action consists of the hero’s constant refusal to identity with these situations and with himself. He is pure possibility; he does not yield to any kind of realisation; he always preserves his “may be” in relation to all the subterfuges and pretensions of existence (let us recall Pechorin or Pier Bezukhov).

 

Another even more probabilistic genre is the essay. It has its roots in the epoch of the Renaissance, of Montaigne. Montaigne, for the first time, tried to talk simultaneously about everything and nothing. He had no prepared theme, genre or idea, but as it were tried himself out in this and in that. If the novel and short-story exist in the sphere of artistic illusion, if the scientific article and philosophical tractatus lay claim to logical strictness and irrefutability, and if the diary and chronicle presuppose truth of exposition and authenticity of fact, then the essay plays with the possibilities of all those genres while conforming to none of them. Montaigne wrote: “I love words that soften the bravery of our claims and introduce into them some kind of moderation: ‘may be,’ ‘in all likelihood,’ ‘partly,’ ‘so they say,’ ‘I think,’ and so forth.”20 “May be” - the formula of the essay - refers, in distinction to the novel, not only to represented reality, but also to the very methods of representation. The essay is a kind of “meta-hypothesis,” encompassing narrative art, philosophy, science, the diary, the confession and the historical document as trial forms of consciousness. According to Robert Musil, author of A Man without Qualities, essayism, as the creative credo of the twentieth century, is the art of “living hypothetically.” It transforms every culturally fixed role into one of the possibilities of authentic existence. Man has no qualities given to him by nature, but there does exist a “quintessence of human possibilities,” a “porous subtext of many other meanings.”

 

Not only different kinds and genres of culture, but culture as a whole is understood in the twentieth century as one of the possibilities of multicultural and transcultural existence. Modern man is no longer locked in the single cultural reality of his birth and upbringing. He stands at the cross-roads of different ethnic, historical and professional cultures, each of which presents itself as a possibility of surmounting the obsessional complexes, manias and phobias of the “native” culture. But they can also appear as mere possibilities, with which he can amuse himself,  but in which he cannot be wholly fulfilled.

 

This “concentration of the possible,” in my view, defines the peculiarity of the newest cultural trend. Works of architecture reveal a plurality of historical styles, yet not one of them is fully developed. Books are written that contain the possibility of many books; buried in them one finds a whole variety of readings, a model for the assembly of many texts (A hundred thousand billion poems by the French poet Raymond Keno, the novels Games of Hopscotch and 62. Model for Assembly by the Argentinean Julio Kortasar, Hussar Dictionary by the Yugoslavian Milorad Pavic and so forth). A computer “hypertext” invites many variations of reading, because it  allows one to move freely from one fragment to another in any order. The most prominent example, which we can here only touch upon, is the computerised “as-if reality” (virtual reality) of the nineteen-nineties. “Virtual” spaces - towns, museums, clubs, universities - are formed on electronic networks, creating a whole new dimension of communicative experience.

 

As has already been said in connection with the economy, credit and insurance are cast in the subjunctive mood. They are no less effective for the fact that they buy and sell “emptiness,” pure possibility, and not a real product. We can now add that the “circulation of possibilities” also defines the current trajectory of the arts.

 

8. Ethics.

 

Ethics has traditionally been considered as a sphere of normative judgements. Its statutes were formulated as duties, and were addressed to all representatives of the human race. The most convenient and generally accepted form of ethical judgement was the imperative: “Do not kill,” “Do not fornicate,” “Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you.” and so forth. The “practical philosophy” of Kant, the most influential doctrine in Western ethical thought, is summed up in the “categorical imperative”: “... act only in accordance with such a maxim, that being guided by it you can at the same time will that it might become a general law.”21

 

It is obvious that the imperative form of ethical injunctions is connected to their generality. The general in relation to the individual appears as duty. This is why the first and last words of the Kantian imperative are indissolubly linked : “... act” is in the imperative mood because you must act in such a way that the maxim of your action might become a “general law.”

 

But the general should not be confused with universal. The universal is not something abstracted from the individual but contained within him. Therefore it appears not as obligation, but as possibility. We can imagine a universal ethics constructed in the subjunctive, and not in the imperative mood; an ethics of possibility, and not of duty.

 

A critical introduction to such an ethics has already been supplied by Nietzsche: “If we investigate the matter thoroughly, it is with such naiveté that they say: ‘man must be thus or so!” Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, a luxuriance of extravagant games and changing forms; but some miserable hack-moralist says: “No! Man must be different!”22 But if we agree with Nietzsche that man is, and remains what he is, in reality, in this “enchanting wealth of types,” then any possibility of ethical judgement disappears. It is not enough simply to remove duty from ethics, because “reality” in itself is completely void of ethics. It admits of description, but not of evaluation. This is why Nietzsche’s rebellion against duty in the name of “life as it is” so often slides into a rebellion against morality as such, with its innate “anti-naturalism.” “We immoralists!” Ethics cannot be a mere justification of existence, a description of man as he is. Berdyaev saw something positive in the moral crisis enveloping the world in the twentieth century, namely “the transition from a consciousness for which morality is obedience to general laws, to a consciousness for which morality is the individual’s creative task.”23 If morality does not call man to duty, it can still call man to possibilities.

 

Ethics enters the world of possibility at its most basic level - the ABC of etiquette. To be specific, speech-etiquette consists of avoiding, by any means, the imperative mood and replacing it with the subjunctive. Instead of, “Pass me the water!” - “Could you pass me the water?” This might sound like a pure formality, but the form in this case is highly significant. Polite people do not burden each other with their needs, but delicately grant each other the opportunity of satisfying them. I need you to do this or that, but I do not force you to do it; I grant you the opportunity of doing it of your own free will. The necessity which we experience in ourselves is presented to the other person as a possibility, which he is free to realise or not to realise. The demands of some people are transformed into the possibilities of others - this is the alchemy of courtesy. Etiquette is the emancipatory priority of possibility over necessity in relations between people.

 

One might object that the highest ethical considerations should have nothing in common with the rules of courtesy. It might be gauche to demand a glass of water from a close friend, but it is not at all shameful to demand from humanity seas of blood in the name of such universal moral principles as equality, justice and so forth. It is doubtful, however, that higher ethics was established in contradiction to basic etiquette. It is more likely that it represents an outgrowth, an elaboration of etiquette. If the initial moral intuition consists in concealing ones own necessity in the form of another’s opportunity, then the essence of ethics has already been defined as a widening of another person’s sphere of opportunity. Courtesy is only a formality so long as it hides its own interest under the inviting gesture - “couldn’t you?” The transition to higher ethics doesn’t destroy the rules of courtesy; it merely removes their formality. The possibility we give to others ceases to be a sophisticated means for the satisfaction of our own desires and becomes an end in itself - an opening up of possibilities for another. The other appears to me in the fullness of his spiritual, creative and emotional possibilities, and if I assist in their development, formal courtesy between us has grown into a truly meaningful ethical  relationship. Even though the rules of courtesy have existed for many centuries, their prototypical significance for the new ethics has become clear only now, with the collapse of imperative morality. Morality consists of the possibilities we create for one another.

 

..............

 

In our social and spiritual life we observe a continual process, diametrically opposed to the process known as “realisation.” Even the past, which undoubtedly was what it was, involuntarily allows the possible into its own completed world. Every fact, to the extent that it is distanced from us, becomes a hypothesis. The field is opened for interpretation, for a multitude of “what would be ifs.” We begin to wonder about that which before we knew. Yesterday’s fact is transformed into today’s hypothesis.

 

In the words of Max Weber, “the question, what might have happened if Bismarck, for example, had not decided to start a war, is by no means ‘empty.’ The conclusion that the absence or alteration of one historical fact in the complex of historical conditions might have led to a change in the course of history seems extremely important for the establishment of ‘the historical significance’ of that fact.”24 History, from the point of view of the historian, is not only that which was, but also that which could have been, or else the individual fact loses its meaning. From this derives the view of history itself as of a process of accumulating possibilities; every epoch absorbs the unrealised possibilities of the previous epoch. In every epoch there are more possibilities than in the previous, even though the volume and measure of real time remains the same: day, year, century...

 

From this observation derives the strange feeling that historical reality is becoming increasingly transparent, that it is being permeated by bubbles of air. Arnold Toynbee happily named this process “etherealisation” - the rarefaction of the material substrata of history, its transmutation into a more spiritual, ethereal condition. If the creative Word, by which the world was made, is a verb, a word-act, then history represents the conjugation of this Verb, its translation from the indicative into the subjective mood.

 

At the present time the actual world still seems to be the point of departure for most kinds of human action, which are directed towards understanding and changing reality. But gradually the signalling, informational, computerised universe is swallowing up the universe of facts, making possible things that were formerly impossible. This process represents a change in the modality of the world. At the beginning of the new historical era we are confronted with a superabundance of being, with its translation into the mode of “if.” The subjunctive case represents a huge sphere of new spiritual experience, new delicacy, tolerance and intellectual generosity. It opens up the way to a peaceful “ingrowth” of the future into the present. The future even penetrates our understanding of the past; it allows us to see the past as a multitude of alternatives. It allows us to grasp the meaning of historical events, significant only to the extent that they “might not have been” or “might have been different.”

 

Thus in the new model the future is not “liberated” from the present or from the past, but endows them with the richness of its own meaning-creating freedom.

 

      October  1998

                                                                                    Transl. Edward Skidelsky

 

Footnotes:

 

*This essay was submitted for the International Essay Prize Contest set up by Lettre International, the European literary magazine, and Weimar 1999 - Cultural City of Europe in cooperation with Goethe-Institut. The topic: "Liberating the Future from the Past? Liberating the Past from the Future?" The ten winning essays, this one among them, were selected out of approximately 2,500 submissions from 123 countries in the anonymous process of evaluation by  seven national juries (English, German, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic) and  the international jury of writers and scholars. 

1 “About our journal. How we understand tradition.” Milyi angel (Fair Angel). Esoteric Review. Moscow, Artogia, 1991, vol. 1, p. 1. This journal, edited by A. Dugin, is the theoretical organ of the Russian and international “conservative revolution.”

2  Alexander Dugin. “The Riddle of Socialism.” Elements, No. 4, 1993, p. 17

3  This is an untranslatible play on words. The Russian word is “oboroten’,” which means “werewolf,” but also carries the implication of “reversal.”

4  Material on the Physiology of Russian Society. Russians’ opinion of themselves. Collected by K. Ckalkovsky. S. Pb, typography A. S. Souvorin, 1904, p. 6

5  Ibid, pp. 39, 10, 21

6  Yury Lotman and Boris Uspensky, The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History. Ed. A. D. Nakhimovsky and A. S. Nakhimovsky. Ithica & London: Cornell University Press, 1985, pp. 31, 33, 63.

7  Différance, in, Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass. University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 13

8  Ibid, p. 8.

9  Mark C. Taylor, “Erring: A Postmodern A/theology”, in From Modernism to Postmodernism. An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Cahoone, Oxford, 1996, pp. 526-527

10  Derrida, op. cit., p. 17

11  Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Duke University Press, 1993, p. 374

12  M. Bakhtin, Problems in Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 4.M., “Sovietskaya Rossiya,” 1979, p. 193

13  S. L. Frank, “Unfathomability,” in Sochineniya. M., “Pravda,” 1990, p.216

14  This is a play on words. The Russian word for abstraction, otvlechyunnost’, derives from the Russian word for attract, privlekat’.

15  Alexander Blok, “Oh, I would live life to extremes ...”

16  Jean-Francoise Lyotard, “Zametki na polyakh povestvobanii,” Kommentarii, No. 11, 1997, p.215-216. [J.-F. Lyotard, “Apostille aux recits,” Le Postmoderne explique aux enfants, Galilee, 1986.]

17  M. M. Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel,” in Literaturno-kriticheskie statyi, Moscow, “Khudozhestvennaya literatura,” 1986, p. 405.

18  Ibid, p. 421

19  Ibid, p. 424

20  Michel Montaigne, Opyti, Moscow, “Nauka,” 1973, vol. 3, ch. 11, pp. 233-234

21  I. Kant, Collected Works, vol. 4, Moscow, 1965, p. 260

22  Fredrick Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophise with a Hammer, vol. 2, Moscow, “Mysl,” 1990, p. 576

23  Nikolai Berdyaev, “The Meaning of Creativity,” Collected Works, Paris, YMCA-Press, 1985, vol. 2, p. 299

24  Max Weber, “Critical Studies in the Logic of Science and Culture,” Selected Works, Moscow, “Progess,” 1990, pp. 465, 466-467.